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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of international trade is one of the most complex
and difficult forms of economic regulation entrusted to government.
Not only must the regulator consider the problems of economic
regulation inherent in domestic programs, but he must also consider
diversity of national laws, elements of public international law, and
questions of policy dictated by foreign relations. The United States
must realize that economic regulation is still in its infancy in most
nations of the world-even in countries that are highly industrial-
ized.
International trade can be regulated through tariff and nontariff
methods, by escape clause actions, I voluntary and involuntary re-
straints, and other mechanisms. The regulation of "unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts" should be the least controversial of
all types of regulation. Such regulation of unfair trade practices,
contrary to restraints on trade, actually should enhance worldwide
efficiency and move every nation toward the positive benefits of
comparative gain. However, the application of various United
States trade laws, because of overlapping jurisdiction and different
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily
reflect the view of the entire Commission at the United States International Trade Commis-
sion.
** Chairman, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.; A.B.,
University of Georgia, 1960; M.A., St. John's College, Oxford University, Oxford, England,
1963.
*** Legal Adviser to the Chairman, United States International Trade Commission, Wash-
ington, D.C.; B.S., Oklahoma State University, 1967; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 1973;
Ph.D. cand. Fitz-William College, Cambridge University, Cambridge, England; Member of
the Bar of the District of Columbia and Oklahoma.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat. pt.
5, A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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interpretations of these laws, has insured a lively jurisdictional de-
bate among the government enforcement agencies. Other than the
United States International Trade Commission (the Commission),
the key federal agencies involved in international trade regulation
are the Department of Justice,2 the Department of the Treasury,3
and the Federal Trade Commission.'
Further complicating the question of jurisdiction over the regula-
tion of international trade is the distinct authority of the Congress
under article I, section 8, of the Constitution to regulate foreign
commerce, and the general constitutional powers of the President
to conduct foreign relations. Where foreign commerce ends and for-
eign relations begin is often not easy to discern.
The Commission is an independent agency created by the Con-
gress, to which Congress has delegated some of its constitutional
authority to regulate foreign commerce. Headed by six commission-
ers, no more than three of which can be from the same political
party,5 the Commission enjoys unique independence from the Exec-
utive, a status fostered by the Congress' belief that the Commission
should be bipartisan.' To enhance this independence the Congress
enacted new legislation to allow the Commission to represent itself
in the courts,7 and to enable the Commission to go directly to the
Congress for funding and oversight, rather than through the office
of the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and
Budget) .8
2 See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11
(1970).
3 Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 and Supp. V 1975) and countervail-
ing duty legislation, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975).
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 795.
SENATE COM. ON FNAN CE, TRADE REFORM Acr OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 115 reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7259. (hereinafter cited as
FINANCE COMM. REPORT).
19 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 2232 (Supp. V 1975). The Finance Committee Report states:
The Committee strongly believes that the only way to preserve the strict inde-
pendence of the Commission from unwarranted interference or influence by the
Executive Branch is to place its budget directly under the control of Congress.
Consequently, section 175 of the bill would more specifically identify the Commis-
sion as an agency independent from the Executive departments, would provide that
the budget of the Commission shall not be subject to revision by the President
under the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, but rather shall be included by the
President in the Budget without revision. Further, any necessary apportionment or
reapportionment of appropriations required by section 3679 of the Revised Statutes
(31 U.S.C. 665) would not be subject to the control of the Director of the Bureau of
(Vol. 8:27
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By keeping in mind the rather unique, independent character of
the Commission and by examining the pertinent law, legislative
history, and Commission practice, one may gain a better feeling for
the authority of the Commission to regulate "unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts" in international trade.
II. COMMISSION'S STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The Commission's statutory authority to regulate "unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair acts" in international trade is found
in section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,' as amended by the Trade
Act of 197410 (the Trade Act). Section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, provides:
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION DECLARED UN-
LAWFUL.-Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by
the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry,
efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to
prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared
unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be
dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided
in this section."
Prior to the amendments to section 337, the Commission had
traditionally applied the section almost exclusively to patent in-
fringement cases," the Commission's in rem jurisdictional authority
seeming to be particularly appropriate in those cases. However, with
the Trade Act's passage in 1974, the amendments to this section
clearly provided an increased emphasis on the regulation of non-
patent violations.
One important amendment changed Commission "recommen-
dations" to "determinations," thus altering the roles of the Coin-
the Budget, but rather by the Commission officer having administrative control of
such appropriation.
FINANCE COMM. REP. supra note 6, at 118.
* 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (amended 1975).
io Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in large part at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp.
V 1975)). Section 341 of the Trade Act amended section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
2 Notable exceptions include Tractor Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 443 (Dec. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Tractor Parts] and Watches, Watch Movements and Watch Parts,
Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 177 (June 1966) (hereinafter cited as Watches].
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mission and the President in determining violations of the statute.
Prior to this amendment, the Commission could only give the
President its advice on whether the section had been violated. The
President was empowered to make the final determination based
on the Commission's recommendation and other considerations.
Under the current law, the Commission is now the body making
the final determination subject to judicial review.'3
While the President no longer has the authority to make final
determinations under this section, he does have the authority to
disapprove Commission decisions for "policy reasons."" By giving
the President an opportunity to disapprove Commission determina-
tions for "policy reasons," the Congress was attempting to provide
a mechanism whereby the President could coordinate foreign policy
considerations with more economically oriented international trade
issues. The Senate Finance Committee Report states:
It is recognized by the Committee that the granting of relief
against imports could have a very direct and substantial impact
on United States foreign relations, economic and political. Fur-
ther, the President would often be able to best see the impact
which the relief ordered by the Commission may have upon the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive arti-
cles in the United States, and United States consumers."
Thus, while the new legislation has given increased authority to the
Commission, it has tempered this authority with a presidential veto
for policy reasons.
Another significant amendment formalized the hearing process at
the Commission. While the provisions of section 337 prior to its
amendment by the Trade Act would, if interpreted literally, make
the statute appear to be an "antitrust" statute, the hearing proce-
dures were clearly inadequate for antitrust purposes. The Commis-
sion was not subject to provisions for prehearing discovery, and the
Commission's decisions were often based on confidential informa-
tion which was not "on the record." So inadequate were the Com-
mission's procedures that one antitrust expert described the
, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
' FINANCE COMM. REP. supra note 6, at 199. It should be noted that the Commission, under
sections 337(d), (e), and (f), the remedy sections, also considers prior to its remedy determi-
nations the effect of such remedies on the public health and welfare, competitive conditions
in the United States economy, and United States consumers.
[Vol. 8:27
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thought of antitrust proceedings under such procedures as "mind-
boggling."'"
In changing section 337 to a provision which would adequately
deal with "antitrust" or non-patent "unfair acts," the Congress
recognized the inadequacies of the hearing procedures and at-
tempted to correct the deficiencies. Section 337(c) provides, in part,
that "[e]ach determination . . . shall be made on the record after
notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the provi-
sions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code [5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)].' ' Thus, by placing
section 337 hearings under the provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, a major procedural gap was closed, thereby bringing
the Commission closer to being a true regulatory agency.
In addition, the Commission promulgated new rules which fur-
ther enhanced the opportunities for reasonable "antitrust" or
"unfair act" proceedings." The early fact-finding hearings under
section 337 were conducted before a Commissioner who served as
presiding officer. Now the Commission has added two Administra-
tive Law Judges, before whom hearings are generally held, and who
certify the record with their recommended determination to the
Commission for its final decision. While it would be incorrect to say
that the Commission has perfected its procedures, it has largely
fulfilled the requirements of "due process" which must be dealt with
before an agency can properly conduct complex "antitrust" or
"unfair act" cases.
Remedy provisions were also revised by the Trade Act amend-
ments of section 337. Prior to the amendments of the Trade Act, the
remedies which were available were so harsh that, in many cases,
they were simply unworkable. The remedies were themselves often
anticompetitive, requiring exclusion of the offending articles. This
"anticompetitive" remedy did not facilitate the proper application
of section 337 as an "antitrust" statute.
Section 337(f), as amended, was intended by Congress to alleviate
this problem."9 This section provides:
11 La Rue, Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act and Its Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart, 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 608, 618 (1974).
"19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. V 1975).
" The rules became effective on May 27, 1976, 30 days after their publication in the Federal
Register at 41 Fed. Reg. 17710 (1976).
" The Finance Committee Report states:
Section 337(f) of the Act, as amended by this bill, would be a new provision
authorizing the Commission to issue cease and desist orders, in lieu of excluding
19781
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CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS.-In lieu of taking action
under subsection (d) [exclusion of articles from entry] or (e)
[exclusion of articles from entry during investigation], the Com-
mission may issue and cause to be served on any person violating
this section, or believed to be violating this section, as the case may
be, an order directing such person to cease and desist from engag-
ing in the unfair methods or acts involved, unless after considering
the effect of such order upon the public health and welfare, com-
petitive conditions in the United States economy, the production
of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
United States consumers, it finds that such order should not be
issued. The Commission may at any time, upon such notice and
in such manner as it deems proper, modify or revoke any such
order, and, in the case of revocation, may take action under
subsection (d) or (e), as the case may be. 0
Taken alone, this section may be insufficient, as the sanction
against violating a cease and desist order is the same harsh remedy
which caused the need for the creation of the cease and desist au-
thority. Nevertheless, with the basic statutory authority now in ex-
istence, the Commission is in a position to perfect its cease and
desist authority through regulations, and the Act has now been
amended in such a fashion as to make it possible to attack
"antitrust" or "unfair act" problems without employing
"anticompetitive" remedies.
The Commission has also sought to fill a void in the remedy
options it has available by the use of consent orders. While there are
no statutory provisions for consent orders, in Color TV Sets, 21 by far
the most important antitrust case considered under section 337 to
date, the Commission issued consent orders which were negotiated
by the parties, including the Commission's investigative staff, and
thereby terminated the investigation. The Commission had clearly
articles, against any persons violating, or believed to be violating, section 337 ....
It is clear to your Committee that the existing statute, which provides no remedy
other than the exclusion of articles from entry, is so extreme or inappropriate in
some cases that it is often likely to result in the Commission not finding a violation
of this section, thus reducing the effectiveness of section 337 for the purposes in-
tended.
The power to issue cease and desist orders would add needed flexibility ...
FINANCE COMM. REP. supra note 6, at 198. See also, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance on H.R. 10710, The Trade Reform Act of 1973, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1999, 2011 (1973)
(statement of Harvey Kaye and Paul Plaia, Jr.).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. V 1975).
" Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-TA-23 I.T.C., filed Jan.
15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Color TV Sets].
[Vol. 8:27
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not moved as quickly as it should have in promulgating rules for
settlement by consent, but through reasonable negotiation by all
parties, was able to enter the order. The Commission has now
drafted proposed rules for the settlement of consent orders, which
will be published for comment shortly.
Another significant amendment to the Act is its increased empha-
sis on competition. Section 337(b)(2), as amended, provides:
During the course of each investigation under this section the
Commission shall consult with, and seek advice and information
from, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and such
other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate. 2
Further, the remedy subsection of the section provides for the Com-
mission to consider the effect of exclusion or cease and desist on the
"public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the proouction of like or directly competitive arti-
" 23cles in the United States, and United States consumers ....
The Senate Finance Committee Report gives even stronger em-
phasis to the consideration of competition when it states, "[tihe
Committee believes that the public health and welfare and the
assurance of competitive conditions in the United States must be
the overriding considerations in the administration of this
statute."2" (emphasis added).
The above mentioned amendments to section 337 are crucial to
an understanding of the Commission's interpretation of its new-
found authority and aggressiveness. Add to these factors the Com-
mission's independence from the executive branch and its close ties
to the Congress, 5 and one can easily see the transformation of the
agency from one which was somewhat passive to one which will have
an ever-increasing role in dealing with competition issues in interna-
tional trade.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Section 337, as amended by the Trade Act, reflects the authority
of the Congress under article I, section 8 of the Constitution to
v 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
n 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e), (f) (Supp. V 1975).
21 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 197.
The Commission's oversight committees in the Congress are the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Ways and Means Committee, the two congressional committees
which have primary responsibility for international trade.
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regulate trade or commerce with foreign nations. "Subject matter
jurisdiction," means that the court, or in this case the agency, has
the authority to hear the issues before it. Section 337 specifies when
the Commission may exercise "subject matter jurisdiction." It may
do so if:
(1) an article is imported into the United States, and
(2) if such imported article is sold in the United States by an
owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, and
(3) if such sale of the imported article constitutes an unfair
method of competition or unfair act.26
In addition, if overriding public policy considerations do not exist,
the Commission may issue an exclusion or cease and desist order.2
That the Commission has the jurisdiction to hear cases involving
the importation and sale of articles which infringe patents has never
been seriously questioned; however, disputes have arisen as to
whether the Commission can, or should, exercise jurisdiction over
non-patent "unfair methods of competition or unfair acts," and
those cases involving pricing problems or economic incentives possi-
bly covered by the Antidumping Act 2 or countervailing duty laws,
respectively.
The Commission had, prior to the passage of the Trade Act and
its amendments of section 337, taken jurisdiction over cases involv-
ing alleged non-patent violations,30 and, in its amendments to sec-
tion 337 the Congress had not seen fit to alter this approach. To the
contrary, all indications are that the Congress approved of the Com-
mission's practice. The Senate Finance Committee Report states,
"[n]o change has been made in the substance of the jurisdiction
conferred under section 337(a) with respect to unfair methods of
competition or unfair acts in the import trade."'"
2, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
27 Id.
19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975).
11 The Commission had previously considered non-patent violations to fall within the scope
of section 337. In Watches, supra note 12, at 13, the Commission was unable to find facts
sufficient for an affirmative finding, it did state:
If, however, in the importation or sale of articles such an organization imposes
unreasonable restraints upon trade and commerce in the United States, or monopo-
lizes such trade and commerce, or engages in unfair methods of competition tending
to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, section 337 may
be applicable.
And, in Tractor Parts, supra note 12, at A 44-46, the Commission again defined its jurisdiction
in tems of non-patent violations.
11 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 194.
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As to what constitutes "unfair methods of competition or unfair
acts" the courts have generally interpreted the term broadly. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in the case of In re Northern
Pigment Co.,3" held:
We are of the opinion that when Congress used the phrase, in
section 337(a) . . . "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles into the United States," it did not
intend that before such methods or acts could be stopped, the act
had to fall within the technical definition of unfair methods of
competition as it had been defined in some of the decisions, but
we think that if unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States are being practiced
or performed by anyone, they are to be regarded as unlawful, and
the section was intended to prevent them. 3
Almost identical language was used by the same court in the case
of In re Von Clemm,34 when the court stated:
The statute here under consideration provides broadly for action
by the Tariff Commission [now the International Trade Commis-
sion] in cases involving "unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts in the importation of articles," but does not define those terms
nor set up a definite standard . . . . [Tihe quoted language is
broad and inclusive and should not be held to be limited to acts
coming within the technical definition of unfair methods of compe-
tition as applied in some decisions.35
And, the Supreme Court, in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 36 stated in reference to the Federal Trade Commission Act37
that, "[w]hat are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus to be
determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of
particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a spe-
cific and substantial public interest.
38
32 In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
3 Id. at 455.
V 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
Id. at 443-444.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
15 U.S.C. § 41, et seq. (1970).
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532-33 (1935). Other instances
where the courts have dealt with defining language like, or comparable, to section 337 lan-
guage include: In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934); In re Amtorg Trading Corpora-
tion, 75 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1935); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643 (1931); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Frisher & Co., Inc. v.
Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
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Commission practice has been to define "unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair acts" in terms of traditional antitrust or unfair
competition statutes. In Chicory Roots, 39 the Commission Memo-
randum Opinion stated:
Although there are [as yet] no judicial precedents involving non-
patent cases arising under section 337, judicial determinations
under other antitrust and unfair competition statutes are persu-
asive in determining what constitutes an unfair method or act
under section 337. The Commission has in previous investigations
both under the prior section and under section 337 as it exists
today, used the antitrust laws and the practice thereunder as the
standard for unfair methods of competition and unfair acts. 0
However, section 337 is a unique statute, and it is entirely possi-
ble that some actions which do not violate other antitrust or unfair
competition statutes may still violate this section. In Electronic
Audio Equipment,4' the Commission recognized this uniqueness
and the Presiding Officer, in his opinion which was certified to this
Commission stated:
In conclusion, I have scrutinized other antitrust provisions, par-
ticularly section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC
Act and found that neither the letter nor the spirit of such laws has
been violated. . . .
In order for a just determination to be made, the facts in this
particular proceeding necessitated an examination of how section
337 relates to other domestic antitrust laws. However, it is believed
that section 337 is a unique statute, applicable to the importation
of merchandise, and may therefore reach conduct which might not
apply to other antitrust laws."
Another point of controversy between United States agencies as
to the definition of "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts"
is predatory pricing and economic incentives.4 3 The Antidumping
9 Chicory Root-Crude and Prepared, Investigation No. 337-TA-27 (I.T.C., filed June 11,
1976).
40 Id.
"' Certain Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (I.T.C.,
filed July 10, 1973), I.T.C. Pub. No. 768 (Apr. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Electronic Audio
Equipment].
42 Id. at 46-47. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals would seem to agree with this
interpretation. In the case of the In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d at 444, the court stated, "[tihe
importation of articles may involve questions which differ materially from any arising in
purely domestic competition, and it is evident from the language used that Congress intended
to allow wide discretion in determining what practices are to be regarded as unfair."
,1 For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Kaye & Plaia, The Relationship of Countervail-
[Vol. 8:27
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Act of 1921, as amended,44 and countervailing duty law, as
amended, 5 are administered by the Department of Treasury and
the Commission jointly, but under other provisions of law than sec-
tion 337. However, under both laws, a complainant must initiate his
complaint with the Department of the Treasury. The point in con-
troversy is whether certain actions which may properly be filed
under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, and the counter-
vailing duty laws, as amended, may also be filed under section 337
as "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts."
The issue reached its peak of controversy under Color TV Sets
when the Commission received a complaint alleging predatory pric-
ing and unfair economic incentives. The complaint was subse-
quently amended to allege conspiracy to monopolize. Nevertheless,
the Commission received advice from the Department of State,"
Department of the Treasury,47 the Department of Justice,"5 the Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations,49 and the Federal Trade
Commission,50 urging the Commission not to entertain the com-
plaint.
The Commission did decide to entertain the complaint, despite
this advice, and eventually settled the complaint by issuing consent
orders. 5' However, during the course of its investigation, Melco
Sales, Inc., sought to enjoin the investigation, alleging that the basis
for the complaint in the Color TV Sets case was actually within the
purview of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.2 In dis-
missing the complaint Judge Waddy stated:
In this case, nothing in the papers or argument before this court
shows that the Commission proceeding which plaintiff wishes en-
joined or declared unlawful . . . is in excess of the Commission's
ing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 1, 62-77 (1977).
19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975).
, Letter from Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State, to Chairman Will E.
Leonard (Sept. 23, 1976).
" Letter from William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, to Chairman Will E. Leonard
(Sept. 23, 1976).
,1 Letter from Jonathon C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Chairman Will E.
Leonard (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Letter].
,1 Letter from Frederick B. Dent, The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, to
Chairman Will E. Leonard (Sept. 23, 1976).
5 Letter from Charles A. Tobin, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, to Chairman Will
E. Leonard (Aug. 27, 1976).
" Color TV Sets, supra note 21.
51 Melco Sales v. USITC, Civ. Action No. 76-1932 (D.D.C. 1976).
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jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. 1337(a), or that the Commission oth-
erwise acted in a manner that is clearly at odds with the specific
language of the Commission's statutory authority. 3
Melco Sales v. USITC, does not stand for the proposition that the
Commission may exercise jurisdiction over the same cases as the
Treasury Department. As stated before, the complaint in Color TV
Sets had been amended to include conspiracy prior to Melco's at-
tempt to enjoin the Commission. Therefore, in stating that the
Commission did apparently have jurisdiction, the court was not
dealing just with activities which are under the purview of the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty statutes.
The basic rationale of the other regulatory agencies' objection to
the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction can be supported by sec-
tion 337(b)(3), which states:
Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this section, the
Commission has reason to believe, based on information before it,
that the matter may come within the purview of section 1303
[countervailing duty] or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall
promptly notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that such action
may be taken as is otherwise authorized by such section and such
Act.Y
And, the Senate Finance Committee Report states, "[ilt is ex-
pected that the Commission's practice of not investigating matters
clearly within the purview of either section 303 [countervailing
duty] or of the Antidumping Act will continue."55
However, the Commission has yet to receive complaints under
section 337 which are "clearly within the purview of section 303 or
of the Antidumping Act." There have been complaints filed which
contained some elements of these provisions of law,56 but other al-
leged elements of "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts"
also existed. And, it must be kept in mind that section 337(b) pro-
vides, in part, "[tihe Commission shall investigate any alleged
violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its initia-
tive."5 (emphasis added). And, section 337(a) requires that when
unfair acts are found by the Commission to exist they "shall be
n Id. Order filed Nov. 15, 1976.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 195.
" In addition to Color TV Sets, see Above Ground Swimming Pools, Investigation No. 337-
TA-25 (I.T.C., filed Feb. 25, 1976).
1, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law .... ,5" It
would appear that the ambiguity which now exists in the law will
insure controversy in the application of section 337, as it relates to
countervailing duty and antidumping laws, until some clarification
of the law by the Congress or the courts occurs.
Interestingly, despite the broad interpretation the courts have
applied to define "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts,"
or similar language, some of the criticism directed at the Commis-
sion's more aggressive posture in attacking non-patent violations of
section 337 has been predicated on the charge that the Congress did
not really intend the Commission to deal with such cases. However,
even a cursory look at the Senate Finance Committe Report and the
House Ways and Means Report indicates the contrary. The Senate
Finance Committee Report "General Statement" contained the fol-
lowing language:
U.S. trade policy has not been noted for its coherence or consist-
ency. Throughout most of the postwar era, U.S. trade policy has
been the orphan of U.S. foreign policy. Too often the Executive has
granted trade concessions to accomplish political objectives.
Rather than conducting U.S. international economic relations on
sound economic and commercial principles, the Executive has
used trade and monetary policy in a foreign aid context. An exam-
ple has been the Executive's unwillingness to enforce U.S. trade
statutes in response to foreign unfair trade practices. 51
And the House Ways and Means Report "General Purpose" num-
ber 8 states, "[the general purposes are] to improve the procedures
and means of dealing with problems of unfair trade practices in the
United States and abroad." 0 The new powers of the Commission
were the most significant in the Trade Act for dealing with unfair
trade practices. It would seem to be inconceivable that the amend-
ments which were thought to be so important by the Congress were
intended only to improve the procedures for handling patent viola-
tions.
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts are not, by them-
selves, sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Commission. It is also
necessary that there be an importation and sale of the imported
article.6 ' At this point, it is difficult to say, in looking at Commission
-m 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
5' FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 11.
" HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REP.].
,1 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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jurisprudence, whether a nexus is required between the time the
merchandise is exported and the time it is imported into the United
States, or whether a nexus is required between the sale and the
manufacture.
In Monolithic Catalytic Converters2 the Commission released a
party from the investigation who had argued that a nexus was re-
quired between the sale and the importation and that none existed
in his case. In Electronic Audio Equipment the recommended deter-
mination of the Presiding Officer, which was adopted by the Com-
mission, states:
I conclude that a nexus is not required between the time the
merchandise is exported and the time the merchandise is imported
into the United States. If the unfair act is committed in the sale
of imported articles in the United States by an importer, for exam-
ple, the Commission may take jurisdiction. 3
In adopting the Presiding Officer's opinion the Commission speci-
fied that the broad view of jurisdiction was being adopted for that
case alone. And, the facts in Electronic Audio Equipment were suf-
ficient to establish a nexus, even though they were not relied on.6"
In Convertible Game Tables, although the unfair acts complained
of occurred in this country, the Commission adopted a position
which would allow jurisdiction notwithstanding a lack of nexus be-
tween the importer and the foreign manufacturer. 5
IV. In Personam AND In Rem JURISDICTION
The Commission enjoys a unique combination of in personam and
in rem jurisdiction over the parties and the imported articles in
cases of alleged violations of the statute. This authority enables the
Commission to act in certain instances and in certain ways that
neither the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission,
nor the Department of the Treasury may act. 6
62 Investigation No. 337-TA-18 (I.T.C., filed Oct. 21, 1975).
63 Electronic Audio Equipment, supra note 41.
Id.
' Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-34 (Tariff
Comm'n, filed Oct. 26, 1972), Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 705 (Dec. 1974).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY.-If the Commission determines,
as a result of an investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this
section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating
the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless,
after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
[Vol. 8:27
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In personam jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over the parties as it is
sometimes called, has been extended extraterritorially to a great
extent in antitrust and anticompetition statutes recently. This re-
flects a change from the first important United States antitrust
case. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 7 Mr. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, stated "the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done . . .. "Is Just five years later in United States
v. Ham burg-Amerikanische P.F.A. Gesellschaft," a different rule
was used. The court stated:
Citizens of foreign countries are not free to restrain or monopo-
lize the foreign commerce of this country by entering into combina-
tions abroad . . . [s]uch combinations are to be tested by the
same standard as similar combinations entered into here by citi-
zens of this country. The vital question in all cases is the same: Is
the combination to so operate in this country as to directly and
materially affect our foreign commerce?7 °
Such an approach seemed inevitable as increased trade and eco-
nomic interdependence between economies of the world placed
greater pressures on domestic economies.
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall
notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing
such exclusion from entry, upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through
the proper officers, refuse such entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY DURING INVESTIGATION
EXCEPT UNDER BOND-If, during the course of an investigation under this
section, the Commission determines that there is reason to believe that there is a
violation of this section, it may direct that the articles concerned, imported by any
person with respect to whom there is reason to believe that such person is violating
this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive condi-
tions in the United States, the production of like or directly competitive articles in
the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should
not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the
Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry,
and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers,
refuse such entry, except that such articles shall be entitled to entry under bond
determined by the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary.
'7 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
' Id. at 353. A careful examination of the facts establish, however, that significant
"effects" were not present in this case.
-- 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); 216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd for mootness, 239 U.S. 466
(1916).
1o 200 F. at 807.
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By 1945, there seemed to be little question of extraterritorial in
personam jurisdiction. Or, at least this was the view of Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.7'
Judge Hand, writing for the court stated, "[i]t is settled law .. .
that any state impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends... *"7 Not only has
Alcoa been expanded, 3 but key decisions have now been issued
which allow jurisdiction even though the conduct complained of is
sanctioned by foreign governments.74
In addition to extension of in personam jurisdiction so that more
persons can be brought within the scope of United States trade
regulations, there is the problem of concurrent jurisdiction. Not only
can the United States International Trade Commission reach cer-
tain conduct outside the United States, but so can the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The danger of this
concurrent jurisdiction is that a defendant can be brought before
several forums at the same time and for basically the same alleged
violations.7"
The problem of concurrent jurisdiction was addressed in a letter
from the Department of Justice which provided a novel solution to
the problem." It stated:
It has consistently been the position of the Department of Jus-
tice that section 337 was intended by Congress to be a special
statute providing an in rem jurisdictional base, i.e., jurisdiction
over the import brought unfairly into United States markets, in
those situations where traditional concepts of in personam juris-
diction were ineffective to reach wrongdoers outside our territory
71 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2 Id. at 443.
71 See Timken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
" See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. [1963]
TRADE CASES (CCH) 70,600; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954) aff'd
per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). However, compulsion by a foreign government would seem
to be a defense to violation. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Interamerican
Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Co., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970); United States v.
Gulf Oil Corp., [1960] TRADE CASES (CCH) 69,851; But see Jones, Extraterritoriality in
United States Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato", 11 INT'L LAW. 415 (1977) for a
discussion of United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. C 76-99 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
11 The problem of concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of the Treasury has already
been discussed at text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
1 Justice Department Letter, supra note 48.
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S. .. We believe section 337 is appropriately used in situations
where enforcement agencies or private complainants cannot estab-
lish the minimal contacts in the United States of alleged wrong-
doers necessary to assert in personam jurisdiction over them ....
In cases where personal jurisdiction can be effected against those
restraining U.S. import trade through unfair anticompetititive
practices, we believe it appropriate for the Commission to consider
deferring, especially where other law enforcement agencies have
commenced investigations or litigation, or complainants to the
Commission have or may commence private litigation challenging
such conduct under antitrust or unfair competition laws."
The Department of Justice position, it would seem, is that the
Commission should only take cases under section 337 where another
government agency, presumably it or the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, was unable to gain jurisdiction. Under such a policy, the Com-
mission would need to defer to the other agencies and, as a matter
of policy, refuse to hear complaints where in personam jurisdiction
was possible.
The approach of the Justice Department, however, presents at
least two obvious problems. First, the Commission is required to
investigate alleged violations of section 337 when complaints are
properly filed before it.71 No discretion was given by the Congress
in the legislation, or in the legislative history, to allow the Commis-
sion to make a policy decision of this sort. Secondly, the Commis-
sion was given authority to issue "cease and desist" orders under the
amendments in the Trade Act, which is in personam in nature.79 It
would seem inconceivable that the Congress would pass legislation
pertaining to in personam jurisdiction, if the Congress intended that
the Commission should always defer to other agencies which had
equivalent jurisdiction. One of the major directions of the Trade Act
of 1974, which contained the amendments extending the powers of
the Commission in the unfair trade practice area, was to properly
enforce laws relating to international trade. The congressional com-
mittees sponsoring the legislation were the Senate Finance Commit-
tee and the House Ways and Means Committee, the Commission's
oversight committees. Again, it is unlikely that these committees
which are so deeply involved with international trade would sponsor
- Id.
7A 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides in part that "[the Commission shall
investigate any alleged violation of the section on complaint under oath . . . (emphasis
added).
7 19 U.S.C. §1337(f) (Supp. V 1975). See note 19 supra.
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legislation to enhance the Commission's authority and then expect
the Commission not to exercise this authority.
V. FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission does not have the discretionary authority to
refuse complaints brought before it. And, there is no doubt that
concurrent jurisdiction exists with other government agencies. One
of the real challenges to the Commission, and the other agencies
involved, is to find a method of handling the problems created by a
multiplicity of suits involving the same subject matter and possibly
even the same parties. Meetings have already taken place between
the Commission and representatives of the Department of Justice.
The full Commissions of the United States International Trade
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission have met. It is
hoped that these meetings will result in a formalized means of han-
dling the issue of multiple suits.
Even though the Commission has no discretion over whether or
not to investigate properly filed complaints, it can exercise discre-
tion in the type of cases it initiates on its own motion. It is obvious
that a multiplicity of investigations on the same subject matter is
inefficient and costly to American taxpayers. It is reasonable, there-
fore, to assume that the Commission will not invest great amounts
of time and money on cases in which investigations are being con-
ducted by other regulatory agencies.
There are certain cases, however, in which the Commission has
unique capabilities. The Commission has several offices which are
capable of conducting economic analysis on various international
trade issues. A better method of providing other government regula-
tory agencies with early warning of problem areas would enhance
international trade regulation. Proper cooperation between regula-
tory agencies would tend to improve this operation.
In addition, because of its primary commitment to dealing with
international trade issues, the Commission should be thinking more
about its own specialized service. The Commission should be think-
ing about consumer protection. For example, should a different
standard be applied to "point of sale" contracts when the goods are
imported and relief from the manufacturer is not readily available
to the consumer? Should violations of public international law con-
stitute "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts" upon im-
portation and sale of the articles into the United States?
These are simply some of the issues confronting the Commission.
[Vol. 8:27
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The Congress, with its amendments to section 337, has attempted
to close a gap in the regulation of international trade. It is now up
to the Commission to insure that this congressional mandate is
performed in a reasonable, but aggressive, manner.

